Abstract: The conflict between Hindu and Muslims over the Kashmir region is one of the bloodiest religious wars in history, exceeding in violence the Crusades or the “Thirty years war’’. As long as the Indian colony was under British rule, the tensions were kept under control, but during the decolonization movement , the two religions who hatred and feared each other more than they feared the colonial masters, developed in the first phase separate national movements ; the Hindu under Ghandi and the Muslims under Mohammed Ali Jinnah . And after the power transfer in 1947, two states emerged from the ex colony, Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan who have engaged from that moment on in a bloody conflict which lasts until today. The essay presents, using a conflict resolution model, an analysis of the indo – Pakistani war and the interplay between propaganda and diplomacy. I will describe the four major conflicts in the area: the 1947 war, 1965, 1971 the Karghil War from 1999, and the post 2000 situation.
While the propaganda had a crucial role in escalating the conflict, the diplomacy of joint Indo – Pakistani efforts or third parties implication succeeded in mitigate it. But the conflict was never settled, resulting in Johan Galtung’s terms a “negative peace’’. There were of course specialized institutions in launching the propaganda machine such as the Pakistani “ISI’’ (Inter Service Intelligence). A crucial aspect of the problem is that both Pakistani and Indian propaganda is empowered by a cultural violence, deeply rooted in the social aspect of life. A significant part of the article will focus on the so called “bus diplomacy’’ and the 2001 “road map’’ for the implementation of a stable peace in the region of Kashmir. Also, we will see that third parties peace initiatives were less successful than those which came direct from the combatants. Key terms: conflict escalation – de escalation, structural violence, cultural violence, propaganda, positive peace, negative peace, bus diplomacy
The article tries to present the Indo – Pakistani conflict trough the conflict resolution perspective using the “conflict escalation and de escalation model’’ On the other hand it presents the issue of propaganda and diplomacy. Speaking about propaganda, the article does not focus on a material aspect of propaganda such as a specialized institution, or a political discourse but rather on non material aspects; it explains why propaganda is possible taking into considerations aspects such as different historical evolution, religion, culture, nationalism and territorial claims. Diplomacy was in the beginning, especially in the Cold War context the product of third party mediators, and later in the post 1990 period the pacifist impulses came from the combatants. It will be showed that third party initiatives were less effective than the direct Indo – Pakistani talks. I have chosen a specified conflict resolution model to easily show how propaganda escalated the conflict and how the peace initiatives helped to de escalate the conflict.
The article has three sections: the first section presents the conflict resolution methodology and the and the social aspects of propaganda, the second section presents the first three major wars in the area 1947, 1965, 1971 and the role of propaganda and diplomacy, the third section presents the post 1990 evolutions and finally it draws the conclusions about the propaganda, diplomacy and their role in waging the wars. The Indo – Pakistani conflict is much publicized. We can find literature on this issue in both the discipline of history but also in social sciences. Several important works dedicated to this issue are John Stoessinger’s “Why nations go to war”, Victoria Schoefield’s “Kashmir in conflict” describe the conflict from a historical perspective.
On the other hand Galtung’s famous writing in the field of conflict resolution such as “Cultural Violence” or “Searching for peace” speak about the cultural aspects of violence and war but they is not empirically proven. Barry Buzan’s “Regions and powers” is a very complex work and valuable due to the fact that it presents, although limited the “self – other” distinction. There are also lots of writings from Pakistani or Indian scholars but they should be read carefully due to the fact that most of them tries justify the actions of a party. This does not mean that all of them are propagandistic but in some parts they tend to be subjective on the issue. However, none of those writings mentioned above try to present the escalation and de escalation of the conflict using the interplay among war, diplomacy and propaganda.
Conflict methodology and propaganda aspects
The process of a conflict “escalation’’ is very complex and unpredictable, in the sense that new problems may rise and new parts could be dragged into the conflict. The internal political clashes could change the initial tactics and objectives and also could give birth to secondary conflicts and spirals which on a long term can complicate the situation. Also, “de escalation’’ is characterized by “unexpected breakthroughs and setbacks changing the dynamics, with advances in one area or at one level being offset by relapses at others’’  and with the action of third parties influencing the outcome in unforeseen ways.
Offering a simple description we could say that escalation begins when serious differences appear among parties, determined by all social evolutions, giving birth to contradictions. Later in the process, a polarization starts to occur in which antagonistic parties for and the conflict becomes manifest, culminating in the outbreak of direct violence and war. On the other hand de escalation begins with a ceasefire among members, continues with an agreement, followed by a normalization of the situation and subsequently reconciliation, moment in which the conflict is definitively closed. But in the most cases de escalation stops in the phase of ceasefire leaving opened opportunities for new conflicts.
A conflict may be defied as a situation in which two or more parties perceive an opposition of needs, they have the necessary resources and they are willing to spend to obtain their needs and goals. As we see in the diagram a conflict is finally over when the combatants reach the “reconciliation phase”. In our case all peace initiatives have not gone beyond “ceasefire” or “agreement”. After 1998 it is possible to speak about “normalization”, but once again the results seem to be jeopardized by the terrorist issue.
The beginning of the conflict between India and Pakistan: differences, contradictions and polarization
The difference between Indians and Pakistani could be observed first in religion. Hinduism, the main religion of India has a pantheon of gods, considers that the human beings are unequal, idea reflected by their caste system, and in general is a tolerant religion. On contrary, Islam – the third main old India religion after Hinduism and Buddhism – came to India around 1000 A.D. and it is in a total opposition with Hinduism. When the Muslims arrived in the north western parts of the country they destroyed all the Indian temples and sculptures, considering them idolatrous, and this traumatic episode has been preserved over generations in the Hindu collective mentality.
Between 1900 and 1947, in India a peaceful nationalist movement, which was militating for independence, coordinated by Mahatma Ghandi started to develop, in accordance with the spiritual and non violent principles enrooted in the “ahimsa’’. But the Muslim part, fearing possible Indian prosecutions, in the case it were to gain independence its independence, did not ally with Gandhi’s movement, and instead developed its national project, leaded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. The socio – cultural differences between the two ethnic groups are best summarized by Jinnah’s words:
How can you ever dream of Hindu – Muslim unity? Everything pulls us apart : We have no intermarriages. We have not the same calendar. The Moslems believe in a single God, and the Hindu are idolatrous. Like the Christians, the Moslems believe in a equalitarian society, whereas the Hindu maintain their iniquitous system of castes and leave heartlessly fifty millions Untouchables to their tragic fate, at the bottom of the social ladder.
When we speak about socio – cultural differences between the two parties we need to talk about the structural and the cultural violence. Cultural violence refers to all aspects of culture such as religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science, which might be used with the purpose of justifying or legitimize structural violence. While structural violence is a process, the cultural aspect of violence is an invariable and permanent situation. In our situation, as an example of structural violence we can mention the massive migration, both Hindu and Muslims, caused by fear of prosecution from the majority, or poverty determined by the budget allocated to military defense and arming. We can seek for the Hindu cultural violence in their thought of superiority in the relation with the Muslims, and in this way, every distinction self – other may be used for justifying violence against the ones who are on a lower level on the scale of values and dignity. It should be also noted that Hindu only show tolerance against those who also respect their culture.
Through cultural violence, killing and waging war are legitimized due to the fact that you act against an ancestral enemy. Another important aspect is the “self – other” distinction. We should start referring first to the religious aspect. For example, in Islamic culture it is strongly believed that some persons, especially Muslims are closer to God than others – the non Muslims.  Both sides perceive each other as an enemy and a threat to its security. But of much importance is the fact that India’s secular, federal constitution, and its imperial legacy, motivated many in Pakistan to suspect India of wishing to reunite the subcontinent. The principle of Pakistan’s ideology as a homeland for Muslims fuelled Indian fears that its own fractious patchwork of ethnic groups and religions would break apart. Presently, India defines itself as a multicultural civilization, and due to the fact that it is organized as a democracy there will be no problem for Muslims to leave inside it.
To conclude we can say that governments found it convenient to cultivate threat perceptions of the other for their own domestic political purposes. The triumph of nationalism in India meant on the other hand the tragic division of the country. After it gained its independence from British rule, from the ex colony two states emerged: Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. Three crucial aspects were determinant for the future reports between the two parties. First, we have to bring into discussion the massive exchange of population, when seven million Hindu fled from Pakistan to India fearing for their lives. A vast amount of violence and bloodshed accompanied those migratory waves. The second problem was an economic one. For centuries British India was an economic union, and suddenly was divided in three parts: India, East Pakistan and West Pakistan.
The last two areas only had in common the Muslim religion, and the relations between them were characterized by regional jealousies. The last and the most important problem was a territorial dispute over the region of Kashmir – a territory formed by 565 states with a variable size from the one of a country through the one of a village. Nationalism, according to the most widely accepted definition, is the doctrine that the state and the nation should be congruent. Nationalism holds that legitimate rule is based on the sovereignty of a culturally or historically distinctive people in a polity that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics. Territory is frequently a source of conflict due to the fact that the state itself is a place rooted in territory, or in other words territory is at the heart of national identity and cohesion.
When speaking about territorial claims, geographer Alexander B. Murphy believes that the norms that govern the discourse of justification can influence (1) the extent of territory in dispute, dispute, (2) the ways in which armed struggles over territory evolve, (3) the places where interstate territorial conflict is likely to develop, and (4) the solutions to ongoing territorial wars that are considered. We should also mention that in the Pakistani culture the army is the “parent guardian’’ of the national identity, idea deeply rooted in the militaristic aspects of Islam. In the Koran there is a distinction between “dar al harb” (territory where Islam does not dominate) and “dar al Islam” (territory where Islam does dominate). So the army has the mission to conquer all “dar al harb” into ‘dar al Islam’ and also protect from invaders. For Pakistan the region of Kashmir has also an important strategic value:
Kashmir is very important, it is vital to Pakistan’s security. Kashmir, as you will see from the map, is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap on our head, then I am always at the mercy of India…The very position, the strategic position of Kashmir, is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India.
By this moment on we can speak about contradictions between the parties, the emergence of incompatible objectives. India demanded Kashmir on the ground that the region was ruled by a Hindu prince and Pakistan on the ground that Muslims were the majority in the region. The territory had a strategic importance for both sides, with serious impact on their security and geopolitical importance in the Central Asian area. . To further worsen the situation the British rulers led the princely state of Kashmir to determine its future in three possible ways: union with India, union with Pakistan or independence. But the Maharaja Harry Singh elaborated and subsequently signed a document through which he has consented for a union with India. From that moment on the parties were fully antagonized: on a part the Hindu from India and Kashmir and on the other part Muslims from Pakistan and Kashmir.
For many Pakistani Kashmir is part of the national identity and the main source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Even the letter “k’’ form the country’s name stand for Kashmir. Actually Pakistan is an acronym created by a student, Chuduhary Rahmat Ali in 1936 and it stands for the component states: P – Punjab, A- Afghan Northwest frontier region, K – Kashmir, S- Sindh and Tan for Baluchistan. This might also be propagandistic due to the fact that the first rulers of Kashmir were Indians, and the legendary emperor Ashoka was also the founder of the first kashmirian capital, Srinagari. The Muslims, on the other hand came in Kashmir very late, in the 14th century and initiated a mass conversion to Islamism.
The conflicts from 1947, 1965, 1971 and the role of propaganda and diplomacy
Before the war began we can speak about the existence of economic and military violence. In the context of the political and economical destabilization in the area, India has decided to depreciate its rupee – the national currency unit, but Pakistan refused to do so with its own currency unit, and as a countermeasure India decided to stop the jute imports – a raw material which grows in the East Pakistan. Regarding the military violence we have to point out that in Kashmir were bloody clashes between the two ethnic groups. Pakistan described the events as a Muslim uprising against the oppressive regime of the Indian maharaja. Due to the fact that he could not handle the situation, Harry Singh asked for the help of the Indian officials, which intervened military October 1947 and so the first indo – Pakistani war began. By the end of 1947, the two parts were caught in a bloody and violent war, but none of them could claim a clear victory. Eventually India brought the problem in the UN Security Council and finally a ceasefire followed by a peace agreement has been signed in august 1948.
A UN commission for India and Pakistan was created – UNCIP- with the clear role of mediating the conflict, and subsequently SC passed the resolution 47/1947  which stipulated that the two parts must retreat their armies, and to assure the necessary conditions for a future plebiscite over the region. The most important fact was that in accordance with this document the princely state of Kashmir ceased to exist being divided between India and Pakistan, separated by the “line of control’’. The term refers to the military control line between the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir—a line which, to this day, does not constitute a legally recognized international boundary but is the de facto border. From now on, Kashmir was split into Azad Kashmir (in Pakistan) and Jammu and Kashmir (in India).We have to mention that the SC Res. 47 was not binding, due to the fact that it was not acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and in that case it had only the role of a recommendation.
Unfortunately the de escalation did not go beyond the ceasefire agreement and the violence has resumed. Despite the fact that a ceasefire agreement was settled, it only stopped the direct violence, and did not change the attitude of the two combatants. Moreover, the UN resolutions regarding the troops withdrawal behind the line of control and the future plebiscite over Kashmir’s faith were not respected. India has motivated that it will withdraw its troops only after Pakistan will make the first step. The leaders from Islamabad explained their actions by saying that they do not trust at all, the Indian officials. The initial contradictions were further perpetuated, and the two countries decided to step in different alliances in order to assure their security. Pakistan preferred a U.S. approach, while India has moved much closer to the USSR. But in 1962, India was defeated in a small frontier war against China, and later those events had immediate consequences on indo – Pakistani relations.
Polarization can be diminished through the transformations of social ties between combatants: in the moment when the two subgroups interact and engage in common projects the feel as a part of a single group, and in this way the initial differences tend to disappear. But those measures were not taken, and we should also have to take into account the political regime. India was evolving, especially in the Nehru era into a democracy, while Pakistan was an autocracy ruled by military dictators. We can identify a piece of propaganda even in cartography. For example Pakistan maps of South Asia always include Jammu and Kashmir within Pakistan. Cartography propaganda can lead to escalating wars of rhetoric and symbolism. During the beginning of the 1960s the Kashmir issue began to cause concern at the international level, and the main third party mediators being USA, Great Britain and USSR. In the Cold War context the US helped India against communist China and due to that measure and to American – Pakistani there was hope for a peaceful dialogue arose.
Moreover, the Washington and London decision makers hoped they would use India’s desperate need for weapons to persuade Nehru to meet Ayub in order to resolve the Kashmir problem. During 1962 several peace proposals were submitted. For example, India suggested that the ceasefire line (LOC) should become the international boundary, with a few minor realignments and Pakistan supported by UK came with the proposal to internationalize the Valley of Kashmir, but none of those measures were accepted. Pakistan saw India’s refusal to accept UN resolutions as a tacit attempt to annex Kashmir and decided to solve this problem by military means and violence began in April 1965 when a Pakistani military group won a quick victory in the Rann of Kutch marsh. After this episode, when all the political options to prevent a new war were becoming increasingly scarce, a peace effort was still made through the intervention of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.
But the fast Pakistani victory from Rann of Kutch, as the historian John Stoessinger pointed out, led the Pakistani overconfident and the Indians humiliated. Later that year, the Pakistani guerrillas entered the Indian Kashmir, and in September 1965 the second great Muslim – Hindu war in the area began. In this context, UN deployed the UNIPOM mission in the area, responsible with the peacekeeping. Furthermore, to use a conflict resolution term we could refer to an elite peacekeeping, through the efforts of the soviet Prime Minister Alexey Kosygin, who succeeded in bringing the two parts together and signed the Tashkent Agreement, on 10th of January 1966, by the Pakistani president Ayub Khan and the Indian prim minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. The Americans were deeply sinking in the Vietnamese quagmire, and USSR were the only capable of mediating the conflict. But again the diplomatic measures were not enough, due to their focus on the direct violence. A possible solution would have been the emergence of cooperation in the field of security or economy. Later, Prime Minister Shastri’s death, and his replacement with Indira Ghandi, would constitute an important aspect of the 1971 war.
As we noted at the outset, the model of escalation and de escalation assumes the emergence of new problems, and new parts which may be dragged into the conflict. The 1965 war would gave birth to new contradictions, this time in Pakistan, between the eastern and the western part, the first accusing the leaders from Islamabad of neglecting the security needs of the Eastern Pakistan. In addition there were significant social and economic differences between the two parts. Despite the fact that they belonged to a common religion, there was an uneven economical distribution of resources (2/3 from the national industry, 4/5 of the bank capital) , a political monopoly in favor of the West Pakistan which also believed in a sentiment of racial superiority, over the eastern Bengalis. After the 1970 elections from Pakistan, won by Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman’s Awami League from Bengal a bloody ethnic conflict broke out between East Pakistan (future Bengal) and West Pakistan.
This issue is particularly important for the initial confrontation between India and Pakistan. Despite the peace agreement signed in 1965 a new war between those two parts broke out. Huge waves of Bengali migrants who left their shelter for the fear of persecution, found a refuge in India causing a serious demographic imbalance in the Western part of the country and requiring huge amounts of money to be humanitarian assisted. At this point, Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi concluded that a possible war with Pakistan would be cheaper than assisting the refugees. After failed negotiations over the status of Bengal, Pakistan launched a preemptive strike against India on 3rd December 1971, inspired by the Israeli war against Egypt from 1967, and so the third indo – Pakistani war begun. But the impulse of de escalation, this time came from Islamabad, due to the massive losses of human life.
A peace agreement was signed in Simla  on July 1972, but the problems were not resolved, obtaining in Galtung terms a negative peace. The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept defeat, and the state-controlled media in West Pakistan had been projecting imaginary victories. To make matters worse both India and Pakistan (India in 1976, Pakistan in 1998) started to develop nuclear programs. As we saw different perceptions helped in escalating the conflict. Due to the fact that cultural violence was not eradicated, both sides defining the other as an irreconcilable enemy normalization and could not be reached. The propaganda, trough this understanding the perceptions and the sentiment of military superiority had a significant role in the 1965 war.
Post 1990 period
The post 1990 period is characterized by three violent episodes: the Jammu and Kashmir insurgency, the Kargil war and the post 2000 terrorist attacks. But more important the Indo – Pakistani decision makers started peace initiatives, without any intervention of a third party mediator.
At the end of the 1980s, massive riots boiled over the Kashmir valley. This is known as the Kashmir Muslim insurgency, and it all started when several radical Muslim parties from Indian Kashmir were demanding for independence or autonomy under SC resolutions. This demanding was supported by Pakistan but rejected by India, which India pointed out that Kashmir had been under a democratic Muslim leadership with an opportunity to rule itself, while Pakistan had been under a military dictatorship for more than twenty-five years since its independence in 1947. Therefore, India argued that for Pakistan to call for self determination Kashmir was disingenuous and hypocritical. But the militants determined to realize their goal engaged the Indian security forces in armed struggle and terrorist actions. Opponent’s of India military occupation of the valley of Kashmir declared that 600,000 soldiers were deployed in Kashmir which in the Indian decision maker view is a gross exaggeration due to the fact the entire Indian army was just over 1 million.
Although the Government of Pakistan denied the support for the militants, India believed that Pakistan through ISI, supplied material and financial support without which the movement would have been easier for the Indian army to suppress. Those were bloody events and massive violations of human rights were reported for both sides. In the post 1990 period there were alternatively disputes and important
peace negotiations. To start with the conflicts we have to mention the Kargil War from May and June 1999, when Pakistani armies ruled by general Pervez Musharaf entered the Indian Kashmir. But except this episode, the were serious peace initiatives such as the prime ministers meeting inside the SAARC (South East Asian Association of Regional Cooperation), the meeting held in the UN Security Council from 1998, or the Lahore Declaration from 1998, known also under the name of” bus diplomacy’’ , through which the two parts engaged in a cooperation process in the field of security and enhanced mutual trust to reduce the fear of a potential nuclear attack.
At the end of 1998, both prime ministers from India and Pakistan agreed that “an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose’’ . The bilateral meetings reached their peak on 20 February 1999 when the Pakistani prime minister, Atal Vajpayee met his counterpart Nawaz Sharif on the inaugural bus service (that is why the subsequent declaration was portrayed bus diplomacy) Delhi – Lahore. This was a historic visit, similar in impact whit Saddat’s visit in Israel after the 1973 war. The Lahore Declaration is the third main attempt to pacify the region after the Tashkent and Simla Agreements, and it appeared that it could finally break the ice. This time the pressure were different, due to the fact that it is an impulse which came from the inside, and it was signed in peace times. Furthermore, the acquisition of nuclear capability, with its inherent risks, has made a dialogue unavoidable.
All these factors have contributed to a desire to break the impasse in Indo-Pakistani relations. The two powers have agreed to alert the other immediately in case of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident, on the other side, and “shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs’’ . Based on a shared vision of peace and stability it was likely to see from that moment on a boost in Indo-Pak trade; relaxation; of visa; opening of a road route for trade; exchange of business information; as also increased cultural and sporting contacts. We can also mention here, the sport diplomacy when the Indo – Pak cricket teams played several games. Another important step was taken in 2001 at the prime ministers joint reunion in Islamabad from 16 – 17 February, where it has been agreed on a road map for the implementation of a stable peace in the area. Furthermore on December 5 2006, president Musharaf declared that he is ready to give up his claims over Kashmir and accept the UN resolutions.
In October 2005 a massive earthquake hit northern Kashmir in the area under Pakistani control. Indo – Pakistani authorities cooperated in rescuing operations and relief efforts, but six months after the disaster all the camps that had provided health, care, food and shelter were closed, this showing us that the old hatred is not wounded. In any case, more important is the fact that all those confidence building measures were not fully effective due to a new issue – terrorism, and we have to mention here the terrorist attacks over Indian soil from 2001, 2007 and 2008. New Delhi officials accuse their Pakistani counterparts of supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir and elsewhere. Also, post 1990 the UN developed a diplomatic mechanism towards conflict prevention, which might be useful in the Indo – Pakistani peace initiatives. According to the UN definition the peace building process consists of a series of activities associated with the reconstruction and societal transformation.
It is a long term process which occurs after violent conflict has ceased, and it is the stage of the peace process following the peacemaking and peacekeeping. We could also include in this process the early warning, prevention of violence, mediation and humanitarian intervention. It be might said that a lasting peace is characterized by the absence of physical and structural violence, absence of discrimination and good governance. On the other hand peace keeping is the intervention of a third party which helps the combatants in their transition from war to peace, separating them and keeping them away from each other.
The peace making process is a diplomatic effort focusing on helping the belligerents in reaching a non violent dialogue and eventually a peace agreement. Despite all those new events the Indo – Pakistani conflict remains very unpredictable. Many scholars have written thousands of pages suggesting an exit situation to this complex issue. Many believe that Kashmir should be an independent state, but this is very hard in practice due to the fact that India, Pakistan and possible China should give up territory, and this is very unlikely.
Without any doubt the conflict between India and Pakistan is one of the bloodiest wars of the twenty century. It is a territorial conflict but powerfully fed by religious and hatred. Propaganda is essential in escalating a conflict, but we do not have to concentrate on the material aspects of propaganda: nationalist speeches, manifestations or specialized institutions. We should ask what the self is beyond propaganda and where all those ideas came from, how the other is represented in relation whit. As we saw, Pakistan perceives India as an enemy due to the fact that it rules the other part of Kashmir and their relation for a long period of time was characterized by mistrust. Unlike other ethnic conflicts, such as the Balkans where the peace is imposed by a third party (the EU), in our case the peace impulse comes from the inside. Pakistan claims based on ethnicity are not fully justified due to the fact that in India are presently more Muslims than in the entire Pakistan.
Sustainable peace efforts came in a moment when there it was no war between the parties and when they reached the conclusion that war implies massive costs. We are far away from the phase of conflict reconciliation; we are in a point between agreement and normalization. Once again the peace initiatives might be jeopardized, this time by the link between Pakistan and terrorism. The conflict started at a time when the UN was getting shape and the organization’s role was quite limited and can not fully reconcile such a confrontation. Resolutions issued by the Security Council are just a recommendation and have a very limited impact on resolving the conflict.
Instrument of Accession, in http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/AccessionDoc.pdf (accessed 14.06.2010)
Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Kashmir Conflict : Abuses in the Kashmir Valley”, in http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/kashmir/abuses.htm ((accessed 14. 06 2010)
SC Res 47/ 1947 in http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/047/72/IMG/NR004772.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 14.06.2010)
Tashkent Agreement in http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/Tashkent_Declaration_January_10_1966.html (accessed 14.06.2010)
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The Lahore Declaration (English version), in http://www.pircenter.org/data/resources/LahoreDeclaration.pdf (accessed 29.08.2010)
Pakistan Prime Minister, Lyakut Ali Kahn speech in http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/June-August2004/hilali.pdf (accessed 04. 09. 2010)
Books and articles
Burnett, Alan “Propaganda cartography’’ in The geography of peace and war, ed. David Peper and Alan Jenkins, 60 – 89 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985)
Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole Regions and powers (Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003)
Galtung Johan, “Cultural violence’’ , Journal of peace research, 27, 3 (1990)
Galtung, Johan Jacobsen, Carl, Searching for peace, (London : Pluto Press, 2000)
Ganguly , Sumit, Kanti Bajpai, “ India and the Crisis in Kashmir’’ 34 – 5, 401-416
Ghali, B B “An agenda for peace’’, 1992, in http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (accessed 15.06.2010)
Indurthy, Rathnam “Kashmir between India and Pakistan : an intractable conflict, 1947 to present’’, in http://www1.appstate.edu/~stefanov/Kashmir%20Between%20India%20and%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed 14. 06 2010) 17
MacLean, Robert Public International Law (London : HLT Publications, 1992)
Maj. Gen. Krishna, Ashok “Indo- Pak relations : bus diplomacy’’, Indo-Pak articler 176, 12, (1999) in http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/indo-pak-relations-bus-diplomacy-176.html (accessed 29.08.2010)
Murphy, Alexander B “ Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims’’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 80 – 4 (1990)
Ramsbothan, Oliver et. al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution 2nd edition, , (Cambridge : Polity Press, 2005)
Schofield, Victoria Kashmir in conflict : India, Pakistan and the unending war (London, New York : I.B.Tauris, 2003)
Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations Go to War, (Boston, New York: Bedford and St. Martins, 2001)
Varshney, Ashutosh “India, Pakistan and Kashmir : antinomies and nationalism’’, Asian Survey, 31- 11(1991)
Vlahos, Michael Fighting Identity : Sacred War and world change (London: Praegar Security International, 2009)
Zehra, Nasim “ Bold Initiative on Kashmir’’, Arab news, December 2006 in http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=90157&d=18&m=12&y=2006
 Oliver Ramsbothan, et. al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution 2nd edition, , (Cambridge : Polity Press, 2005), 11.  Conflict escalation and de escalation diagram in Oliver Ramsbothan, Op. Cit., 12  Ibidem, 9.
 Johan Galtung, Carl Jacobsen, Searching for peace, (London : Pluto Press, 2000), 163.  John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, (Boston, New York: Bedford and St. Martins, 2001) 114  Ali Jinnah, Apud John G. Stoessinger, Ibidem, 116
 Johan Galtung, “Cultural violence’’ , Journal of peace research, 27, 3 (1990) ,291  Ibidem, 295
 Ibidem, p. 168
 Johan Galtung, Carl Jacobsen, Op cit, 164
 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and powers ( Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003) 101  Ibidem, 102
 Ashutosh Varshney, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir : antinomies and nationalism’’, Asian Survey, 31- 11(1991), 999 – 1002  John G. Stoessinger, Op Cit., 117
 Alexander B. Murphy, “ Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims’’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 80 – 4 (1990), 532  Michael Vlahos, Fighting Identity : Sacred War and world change (London: Praegar Security International, 2009) 135  Katherine Ewing, “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 42-2(1983), 251-268  Pakistan Prime Minister, Lyakut Ali Kahn speech, in http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/June-August2004/hilali.pdf (accessed 04. 09. 2010) , John G. Stoessinger, 119
 Instrument of Accession, in http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/AccessionDoc.pdf (accessed 14.06.2010)  Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in conflict : India, Pakistan and the unending war (London, New York : I.B.Tauris, 2003) 43  SC Res 47/ 1947 in
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/047/72/IMG/NR004772.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 14.06.2010)  For a complete interpretation over the UN Charter and the distinction between Chapter VI and VII see Robert MacLean, Public International Law (London : HLT Publications, 1992)  Ashutosh Varshney , Op cit, 1008
 John G. Stoessinger, Op Cit, 119, Victoria Schofield, Op cit. 86  Alan Burnett, “Propaganda cartography’’ in The geography of peace and war, ed. David Peper and Alan Jenkins, 60 – 89 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985)  Victoria Schofield, Op cit. 99
 Ibidem 101 – 105
 John G. Stoessinger, Op Cit, 121
Tashkent Agreement in http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/Tashkent_Declaration_January_10_1966.html (accessed 14.06.2010)  John G. Stoessinger, Op Cit, 123
 Sumit Ganguly , Kanti Bajpai, “ India and the Crisis in Kashmir’’ 34 – 5, 401-416  John G. Stoessinger, Op Cit, 125
 Ibidem , 128
 Simla Agreement, in http://mea.gov.in/jk/sim-ag.htm (accessed 15.06.2010)  Victoria Schofield, Op cit 120
 Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Kashmir Conflict : Abuses in the Kashmir Valley”, in http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/kashmir/abuses.htm (accessed 14. 06 2010)  Rathnam Indurthy, “Kashmir between India and Pakistan : an intractable conflict, 1947 to present’’, in http://www1.appstate.edu/~stefanov/Kashmir%20Between%20India%20and%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed 14. 06 2010) 17  Victoria Schofield, Op cit 217
 The Lahore Declaration (English version), in http://www.pircenter.org/data/resources/LahoreDeclaration.pdf (accessed 29.08.2010)  Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, “Indo- Pak relations : bus diplomacy’’, Indo-Pak articles 176, 12, (1999) in http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/indo-pak-relations-bus-diplomacy-176.html (accessed 29.08.2010)  Nasim Zehra, “ Bold Initiative on Kashmir’’, Arab news, December 2006 in