The Federal Government’s Impact on the Crack Epidemic in the District of Colombia

The term epidemic is typically used in relation to the spread of a disease however; in the mid 1980’s this term was attached to crack cocaine. The crack cocaine epidemic described the impact of a newly created drug on most U.S. cities in the northeast and Mid Atlantic. Washington, D.C. provided the perfect setting for crack cocaine to flourish. Plenty of low-income inner city housing projects complete with open air drug markets labeled D.C. as a leading U.S. city with a major crack cocaine problem. As crack cocaine became a national talking point the federal government stepped in to curb its use. Congress along with other sections of the federal government pushed for a tough approach to crack cocaine. The crack cocaine “epidemic” in Washington, D.C. coincided with President’s Regan’s “War on Drugs”. The creation of a new cabinet position; “Drug Czar” coupled with extremely harsh penalties directed for use and distribution of crack cocaine characterized the War on Drugs. One of the most controversial new penalties was the disproportionate sentence for crack cocaine compared to powder cocaine. All wars have casualties and the unfair and harsh sentences for crack cocaine created by the federal government greatly impacted the D.C. area through a backlash of increased violence.

Also, both Federal and local D.C. enforcement strategies such as undercover stings made Washington D.C. volatile. Violence and crack became synonymous. Crack cocaine was on the heels of the popularity of cocaine, an illegal powder-like substance, that as a stimulant is snorted to produce a euphoric feeling or high. Cocaine hails from the high mountainous regions of South America from the leaves of the coco plant. In the United States cocaine was initially used for medicinal purposes by Sigmund Freud in the 1880’s as a “cure” for depression. In 1886, an exciting new soft drink, Coca Cola, used cocaine as its main ingredient. In the early 1900’s cocaine cut across all stratums of society as an elixir. Soon, the dangers of cocaine and its addictive property became evident and cocaine was banned through The Dangerous Drug Act of 1920. Illegally, cocaine was widely used in the 1970’s with crack following in the 1980’s. Large urban areas throughout the U.S., particularly on the east coast, became the perfect areas to hurdle crack cocaine to epidemic proportions. Washington, D.C. was unable to avoid the impact of this inexpensive and highly available drug.

Without delving very deep into the issue, it seems reasonable to associate the violence and other crimes of Washington D.C. during the late 80s and early 90s directly to the usage of crack cocaine. For example Ronald Fryer argues that, “the rise in crack from 1984-1989 is associated with a doubling of homicide victimizations of Black males aged 14-17, a 30 percent increase for Black males aged 18-24, and a 10 percent increase for Black males 25 and over, and thus accounts for much of the observed variation in homicide rates over this time period.” However, a closer analysis of crack cocaine’s association with increased violence in D. C. will point to the federal government’s policies towards crack as contributing to increased violence as measured by homicide rates, handgun arrests and emergency room visits during the period of the “epidemic”. The most controversial policy put forth by the federal government is the 1 to 100 ratio for the mandatory minimum sentence for crack cocaine compared to powder cocaine. This law was passed after a highly publicized college basketball player’s death at nearby University of Maryland motivated lawmakers to stiffen penalties.

Len Bias died of a powder cocaine overdose, yet the public misunderstood the cause of his death and associated his death with crack cocaine not powder cocaine. Len Bias’ death seems to have been the last straw for Congress on the impact of the crack cocaine epidemic. In 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is passed. This Act unfairly targeted crack offenses. The enforcement of crack cocaine as opposed to powder cocaine resulted in unnecessarily harsh mandatory sentences for both dealers and users. Five grams of crack and 500 grams of powder cocaine resulted in a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence. 50 grams of crack and 5 kilograms of powder cocaine resulted in a 10 year mandatory minimum. A “100 to 1” ratio for crack offenses became a part of the federal sentencing guidelines. Ironically, one of the reasons given for this disparity is that crack involved more guns and violence than the dealing of powder cocaine. Two years later, Congress continued to provide harsh and strict sentences associated with crack cocaine. In 1988, a 5 year mandatory minimum for first time possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine was enacted.

This law made history: There was no other drug for first time possession that stipulated a prison sentence or mandatory minimum sentence. How was the District of Columbia’s violent crime statistics impacted by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the 1988 law that stiffened penalties for possession of crack cocaine? The time period of the crack cocaine “epidemic” in D.C. is generally stated as the mid-1980’s through the early 1990s. In 1986, the year the anti drug legislation was passed, the number of violent crimes in the D.C. area was 9,423. In 1987, the number jumped to 10,016; 1988 indicated another increase to 11,914. A sizable increase from 1988 to 1990 (when the possession penalties increased) was 14, 919. From 1991 to 1992 the number of violent crimes jumped from 14,671 to 16, 685. 1993 recorded the highest number of violent crimes in D.C. during the crack epidemic with 16,888 violent crimes recorded. It is apparent that the increased penalties and stiffer sentences for possession and distribution of crack cocaine did not result in a decrease in violent crime. Violent crime in D.C during the crack epidemic increased despite the imposition of stricter sentencing guidelines.

During a subcommittee meeting on crime, terrorism, and homeland security in 2009 Judge Gohmert stated, “This sentencing disparity between powder and crack cocaine raises important public policy issues, on the one hand, because African-Americans comprise the majority of crack cocaine offenders to crack cocaine penalties that resulted in a disproportionate number of African-Americans serving longer sentences than powder cocaine offenders.” The “War On Drugs” and Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986 required aggressive enforcement. One method is the use of undercover police to enforce these laws. Three factors can jeopardize a dealer’s income: 1) Nonpayment, 2) other dealers encroaching on territories; turf wars and the biggest factor 3) being caught by the police. A method that crack cocaine dealers used to protect these three factors was the use and possession of guns. In the 1980s and 1990’s guns were as plentiful as illegal drugs. The U.S. Department of Justice in a manual of “Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence” cites that “those who are most likely to possess guns are drug sellers and gang members — overwhelmingly young and male.

More than two-thirds of the respondents in one study of urban arrestees stated that the primary reason for owning and carrying a weapon is self-protection — a small number also reported using the weapon for drug trafficking or other illegal activities” These law enforcement personnel contributed to the violence related to the enforcement of crack cocaine laws through the need of users and dealers to arm themselves. Once some drug dealers started to arm themselves others were forced to do the same or risk theft. It is difficult to find specific data on the number of agents due to their clandestine nature. However, the “War on Drugs” and the “Crack Cocaine Epidemic” increased the number of agents assigned to arrest crack cocaine users and dealers. Numerous court cases and newspaper articles on undercover agents and entrapment cases imply that large numbers of undercover agents posing as dealers or consumers of crack cocaine were prevalent in D.C.

On The Washington Post website, the paper features a “Destination Scandals Tour” geared for tourists and locals. The various scandals and locations highlighted on the suggested tour have also been covered in various Washington Post articles over the years. In fact, many of the scandals may have been uncovered by The Washington Post. A famous scandal dubbed “The Kid Who Sold Crack to the President” is featured with Lafayette Park across from the White House as a stop on the tour. An undercover DEA Agent was organized by the Bush Administration in 1989 to illustrate the availability and “epidemic” of crack cocaine right in front of the White House with an undercover sting in Lafayette Park.

The plot was unsuccessful and is the recipient of numerous jokes along with an embarrassment to the Bush Administration. Another very famous scandal that involved another sting operation of undercover officers along with the FBI in D.C. was Mayor Marion Barry’s use of crack cocaine in a D.C. hotel room in 1990. An interview with Bill Alden, retired special agent for the DEA, by Frontline provides a summary of the use of undercover agents to enforce the crack cocaine laws: Being a narc in the 1980s was extremely popular to the point where it was embarrassing. I would make presentations across the United States. People asked for my autograph. People wanted DEA agents in their neighborhood. They wanted them around. They wanted them to be there. It was a whole change in attitude

A professor at The George Washington University, William Chambliss, describes taking his students in the 1990’s on rides with the Metropolitan Police in the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU). He describes the term RIP; the use of undercover agents to buy drugs and to identify the person who sold the drugs. His paper cites in detail a specific case through field notes: It is about 1730 hours on a hot summer day in 1992. Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) is patrolling the Seventh District. The 7th district police are doing drug raids called ‘rips.’ An undercover officer approaches a person suspected of dealing drugs and makes a buy of $10 worth of crack cocaine. The officer then walks away. Another undercover officer is watching. The second officer radios uniformed officers and gives a brief description of the offender. The uniformed officers move in and arrest the suspect. The suspect is then taken to a remote street corner where he is photographed and told to look out into traffic. Various cars drive by. One of the cars is being driven by the officer who made the buy. He looks at the apprehended suspect and positively identifies him.

The purpose of this elaborate process is to maintain the secret identity of the undercover officer. If the suspect were arrested immediately the undercover officer would be compromised in the community. In addition, the type of guns involved with crack cocaine dealing were numerous and quite sophisticated. In 2007, undercover agents were investigating a group of D.C. crack cocaine dealers and were able to purchase firearms that “ranged from semi-automatic pistols to assault rifles and shotguns”. Gun violence resulting in a homicide surged in the mid 1980’s and 1990s. The cause of the increased gun violence is often blamed on crack cocaine. Professor Chambliss states in his paper that “In the last 20 years the crime control industry has experienced unprecedented growth in the United States. The number of police officers has doubled and, since 1980, the prison population has increased by more than 160 percent”. He further concludes that : so long as we continue to criminalize drugs and provide an incentive for police officers and prosecutors to entrap and arrest people for the possession or sale of small amounts of drugs.

The longer it takes, the more lives will be lost and the more the United States will move towards a society permanently divided by race and class into communities that are quasi police states patrolled by RDU-type police units in search of crime and communities where minor infractions of the law are treated, as they should be, as tolerable indiscretions. During the 1980’s and into the 1990’s federal prisons swelled with crack dealers and users convicted under the 100 to 1 law. The intention was to enact harsh penalties to remove these offenders from society to reduce crack cocaine usage and violent crime. However, law makers did not take into account the “replacement effect”. When you put a dealer in prison, a new opportunity is available for another dealer to take over that business or territory. The replacement effect can convey to many types of offenses, but is especially strong for drug offenses.

Therefore, the high incarceration rate associated with crack cocaine offenses essentially opened up opportunities for eager individuals anxious to take over a proven territory. Mothers were significantly impacted by the unfair drug laws. Crack usage among women was very high, which raised the statistics for mothers entering prison. During the 1980’s the rates of women convicted of dealing or possessing crack cocaine skyrocketed. Prior to the 1980’s, the rates of women in prison was fairly low. Crack’s appeal to women and mothers was a unique characteristic of this drug unlike other available illegal drugs. The cost was low and a women’s perception that smoking a drug is more acceptable than using needles to get high. For example, smoking crack for women was preferable to shooting up heroin. In addition to arrests and convictions for possession and distribution of crack, many women engaged in other illegal activities to support their habit. Prostitution and theft were examples of other crimes that landed women in jail or prison in pursuit of this drug.

The impact on the children left behind was dramatic. The impact is two fold: children faced challenges of having a parent or parents incarcerated and many children were placed in foster care. Each of these unfortunate scenarios had negative implications for children. Those children who faced the challenge of both having a parent incarcerated and foster home placement were at a distinct disadvantage. Children living in Washington, D.C. were already at a disadvantage with a high percentage of them living with a single parent. From 1985 to 1990 children living with married parents declined from 58.1% to 53. Living with a single mother increased from 32.6 % to 34.3 % during the same time period. In 1999, Washington D.C. had the highest percentage of children living in single families of any state-70%. Living with a single parent who must report to prison or jail does not allow for the child to fall back on the other parent in most cases. Living in a two parent household obviously gives children a back up plan when one parent is incarcerated.

In addition, two sets of family or relatives can also serve as a back-up. When a family unit is reduced to one parent, the options for back up care are reduced by 50%. The enforcement of the crack cocaine laws led to prison terms for both men and women. The impact on the children left behind resulted in a tremendous surge of children in foster care. The proportion of children in foster care almost doubled. There was a 53% increase in children in foster care from 1986 to 1991. In addition the percentage of younger children placed in foster care increased 110%. The outcome for children in foster care is dismal. Children in foster care are far more likely than other children to commit crimes, drop out of school, join welfare, experience substance abuse problems or enter the homeless population. In addition, 20% of young prison inmates and 28% of homeless individuals spent time in foster care. A survey of children who are projected to turn eighteen in foster care found that 2/3 of boys and ½ of girls had a history of delinquency. The Women’s Prison and Home Association Indicates that children of offends are five times more likely than their peers to end up in prison themselves.

In addition, high rates of incarceration for crack cocaine do not necessarily diminish the impact of the drug on a community. The Justice Policy Institute noted that; It is, however, difficult to find a correlation between trends in incarceration and a reduction of the market since research suggests that the US states with higher rates of drug related incarceration experienced higher not lower rates of drug use. Increased incarceration for crack cocaine did not always take the dealer off the street. For example, Washington, D.C.’ s most notorious crack dealer, Rayful Edmond, continued to aggressively deal drugs while imprisoned in a federal prison. Prior to his incarceration in 1989, Rayful held a large share of the Washington D.C. drug trade. He was known for spending lavish amounts of cash on cars and at clubs. In a Washington Post article about Rayful’s life he is described as “Edmond is to Washington what John Gotti was to New York, an almost mythic figure whose fearless, flashy style fascinated even those who condemned him and the way he amassed his fortune.” While incarcerated, he was arranging deals between D.C. dealers and his Columbian connections on the prison phone.

He was known to spend numerous hours each day arranging drug deals. The Federal and local Washington D.C. government’s strategy of strict enforcement rather than treatment backfired and lead to D.C.’s highest crime rates; especially murder. The Federal Government’s policy changes in the 1980’s gave unnecessary and harsh penalties for crack users and sellers. These harsh sentences coupled with aggressive enforcement initiatives from Federal and local departments created a volatile drug market in Washington D.C. Crime statistics show a direct correlation between the 1986 and 1988 drug laws and violent crime. Many social epidemics spawned out of the violence and prison populations of the late 1980s and 1990s. For example, AIDs and single parent household rates rapidly increased due to a culture of enforcement rather than treatment. If the Federal and local D.C. governments had used a policy of treatment for crack cocaine rather than enforcement and prohibition, Washington D.C. would not have seen the high rates of violent and other related crimes.

Bibliography

Alden, Bill. PBS, “Frontline,” Accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/alden.html

Allen Dupree, and Wendell Primus, “DECLINING SHARE OF CHILDREN LIVED WITH SINGLE MOTHERS IN THE LATE 1990s Substantial Differences by Race and Income “Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2001), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1960 (accessed May 3, 2012).

Bewley-Taylor, Taylor, Chris Hallam, and Rob Allen, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, “The Incarceration of Drug Offenders: an Overview,” Accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BF_Report_16.pdf.

Bilchic, Shay. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Gun Violence in the United States,” Accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/gun_violence/sect01.html.

Cauvin, Hanri. “A Drug kingpin’s Ho-Selling Story.” The Washington Post, July 22, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/21/AR2005072102517_3.html (accessed May 3, 2012).

Doyle, Joseph. “Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effect of Foster Care.” The American Economic Review. 97. no. 5 (2007). http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1583 (accessed May 3, 2012).

Fryer, “Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine,” 2

Hargreaves, George. Barnandos, “Gun Crime.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.barnardos.org.uk/dp-guncrime1.pdf.

Janet, Shickles. United States General Accounting Office, “The Crack Cocaine Epidemic: Consequences and Treatment.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/143293.pdf.

Louie Gohmert, “Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing: Is It Time To Crack The 100 To 1 Disparity?” May 21, 2009

Mary Bissel, and Rob Geen, “Fostering Progress:Facts to Move Children and Families Forward,”Children’s Voice Child Welfare Legue of America, 14, no. 6 (2005), Mather, Mark, and Kerri Rivers. Population Reference Bureau, “The Concentration of Negative Child Outcomes in Low-Income Neighborhoods.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/census.pdf. The Disaster Center, “District of Colombia Crime Rates 1960-2010.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/dccrime.htm. Ronald Braithwaite, Henrie Treadwell, and kimberly Arriola, “Health Disparities and Incarcerated Women: A Population Ignored” American Journal of Public Health, 95, no. 10 (2005): 1679-1681, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449417/ (accessed May 3, 2012).

Stocks, Erica. “Six arrested in local drug crackdown, “The Winchester Star, http://www.co.frederick.va.us/sheriff/news/star1223.htm (accessed May 3, 2012).

William Chambliss, “Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement,” Social Problems, 41, no. 2 (1994): 177-194,

——————————————–
[ 1 ]. Fryer, “Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine,” 2 [ 2 ]. The Disaster Center, “District of Colombia Crime Rates 1960-2010.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/dccrime.htm. [ 3 ]. Louie Gohmert, “Unfairness In Federal Cocaine Sentencing: Is It Time To Crack The 100 To 1 Disparity?” May 21, 2009 [ 4 ]. Hargreaves, George. Barnandos, “Gun Crime.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.barnardos.org.uk/dp-guncrime1.pdf. [ 5 ]. Bilchic, Shay. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Gun Violence in the United States,” Accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/gun_violence/sect01.html. [ 6 ]. Alden, Bill. PBS, “Frontline,” Accessed May 1, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/alden.html [ 7 ]. William Chambliss, “Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement,” Social Problems, 41, no. 2 (1994): 177-194, [ 8 ]. Stocks, Erica. “Six arrested in local drug crackdown, “The Winchester Star, .http://www.co.frederick.va.us/sheriff/news/star1223.htm (accessed May 3, 2012). [ 9 ]. William Chambliss, “Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law Enforcement,” Social Problems, 41, no. 2 (1994): 177-194, [ 10 ]. Ronald Braithwaite, Henrie Treadwell, and kimberly Arriola, “Health Disparities and Incarcerated Women: A Population Ignored,”American Journal of Public Health, 95, no. 10 (2005): 1679-1681, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449417/ (accessed May 3, 2012). [ 11 ]. Janet, Shickles. United States General Accounting Office, “The Crack Cocaine Epidemic: Consequences and Treatment.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/143293.pdf. [ 12 ]. Allen Dupree, and Wendell Primus, “DECLINING SHARE OF CHILDREN LIVED WITH SINGLE MOTHERS IN THE LATE 1990s Substantial Differences by Race and Income “Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2001), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1960
(accessed May 3, 2012). [ 13 ]. Mather, Mark, and Kerri Rivers. Population Reference Bureau, “The Concentration of Negative Child Outcomes in Low-Income Neighborhoods.” Accessed May 3, 2012. http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/census.pdf. [ 14 ]. Doyle, Joseph. “Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effect of Foster Care.” The American Economic Review. 97. no. 5 (2007). http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1583 (accessed May 3, 2012). [ 15 ]. Doyle, Joseph. “Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effect of Foster Care.” The American Economic Review. 97. no. 5 (2007). http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1583 (accessed May 3, 2012). [ 16 ]. Bewley-Taylor, Taylor, Chris Hallam, and Rob Allen, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, “The Incarceration of Drug Offenders: an Overview,” Accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BF_Report_16.pdf. [ 17 ]. Bewley-Taylor, Taylor, Chris Hallam, and Rob Allen, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, “The Incarceration of Drug Offenders: an Overview,” Accessed May 3, 2012, http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/BF_Report_16.pdf. [ 18 ]. Cauvin, Hanri. “A Drug kingpin’s Ho-Selling Story.” The Washington Post, July 22, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/21/AR2005072102517_3.html (accessed May 3, 2012). Mary Bissel, and Rob Geen, “Fostering Progress:Facts to Move Children and Families Forward,”Children’s Voice Child Welfare Legue of America, 14, no. 6 (2005),